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DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE (UNIVERSITY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Whitman, a legal historian at Yale Law School, and Professor Hale, a 
political science professor at Boston College have provided us with two accounts of the 
history of the jury as an institution. Whitman’s The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: 
Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial and Hale’s The Jury in America: Triumph and 
Decline have several features in common. Both books are primarily historical expositions 
of daunting breadth. Hale’s history traces the institution of the jury (both criminal and 
civil) from around the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 to present-day America. 
Whitman’s work is even more ambitious. While Whitman’s main focus is on the criminal 
jury, he addresses not only the common law jury but also the Christian theology, the 
medieval ordeal, and the birth of the Continental legal system—spanning the period from 
the birth of Christianity through the eighteenth century. 
Both books also emphasize the different institutional roles the jury has played in 
addition to being a finder of fact in legal disputes. Hale states at the outset that his aim is 
“to examine the jury as Tocqueville saw it: as a political institution.”1 Whitman 
emphasizes the forgotten function of the jury, and especially of the reasonable doubt 
standard in criminal trials, as a procedure for providing “moral comfort” rather than a 
procedure for finding factual proof.2 
The two books differ substantially, however, in the role that history plays for each 
author. Hale, for the most part, takes his history as he finds it. That is, he generally accepts 
                                                          
        *    Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
 1. DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE, at xiii (2016). 
 2. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL 
TRIAL 18 (2016). 
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the conventional historical understandings of the jury’s development, and uses that as a 
platform on which to build a normative position. Specifically, Hale argues that the quality 
of the jury as an institution has declined since the reforms in the middle of the twentieth 
century. Whitman, on the other hand, does not accept the conventional interpretation of 
the historical purpose of the jury and reasonable doubt. Indeed, Whitman’s thesis is 
precisely that the conventional account is wrong. The conventional understanding is that 
the purpose of the reasonable doubt standard is to protect the accused from the harsh 
consequences of criminal punishment. Whitman argues for a contrary view that sounds 
strange to the modern ear: that the reasonable doubt standard was actually developed to 
protect the jurors from the moral and spiritual dangers of imposing criminal punishment 
on the accused.3 
As counterintuitive as Whitman’s claim may seem at first blush, he builds a 
compelling case and ultimately succeeded in convincing this reader, at least, of the 
accuracy of his account. Indeed, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt is a triumph of legal 
history and a genuine delight to read. Whitman’s writing is eloquent, articulate, and 
learned. He has an eye for detail and is masterful in weaving these details into a logically 
structured argument of impressive coherence. 
While The Jury in America does not reach the same impressive heights as The 
Origins of Reasonable Doubt, it is nonetheless a valuable addition to scholarship on the 
jury. Hale cannot match Whitman’s gracefully erudite prose, but the same can be said of 
most academic writing (including, I must grudgingly admit, this book review). But the 
major shortcoming of The Jury in America, and the reason I was ultimately dissatisfied 
with the book, is the author’s normative claim. Hale argues that the jury immediately prior 
to the twentieth century reforms—including removal of the “key man” system—was 
superior to the “postmodern” representative jury that replaced it. This argument fails on 
many levels, and I shall dedicate a substantial portion of this book review to explaining 
why Hale is profoundly wrong about the purported failings of the representative jury. 
The book review proceeds as follows. In Part I, I summarize Whitman’s 
comprehensive and detailed argument that the historical purpose of the criminal jury and 
reasonable doubt standard was to protect the jurors from moral danger. In Part II, I present 
in a briefer summary Hale’s book, and then critique his central normative claim, arguing 
inter alia that Hale fails to appreciate the importance of having a representative jury to 
both its fact-finding and political functions. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
As Whitman notes, “[i]t would be hard to name a doctrine more familiar, or more 
basic to the American sense of justice,” than the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in criminal cases.4 Yet this “majestic” phrase contains a “troubling mystery:”5 we 
do not really know what it means.6 But the mystery goes even deeper than this, according 
                                                          
 3. Id. at 3. 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2 (“The [Supreme] Court has simply abandoned any effort of its own to define the standard.”). See 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 23–28 (1994). 
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to Whitman: we do not even know what it is for. As any first-year law student will tell 
you,7 according to conventional wisdom “the reasonable doubt rule [is] a rule of factual 
proof.”8 The standard of proof is higher in criminal than in civil cases “to make it more 
difficult for jurors to convict.”9 This explanation is quite mistaken, Whitman argues. In 
fact, “[i]t was designed to make conviction easier, by assuring jurors that their souls were 
safe if they voted to condemn the accused.”10 Whitman explains: 
The reasonable doubt rule, this book aims to show, is the last vestige of a vanished 
premodern Christian world. At its origins, this familiar rule was not intended to 
perform the function we ask it to perform today: It was not primarily intended to 
protect the accused. Instead, it had a significantly different purpose. Strange as it 
may sound, the reasonable doubt formula was originally concerned with protecting 
the souls of the jurors against damnation.11 
In order to fully “understand our contemporary law, we must leave modern legal 
doctrine behind and dive deep into the waters of medieval Christian moral theology.”12 
Whitman takes us with him on this dive, and the waters are deep indeed. Whitman begins 
a thousand years before the birth of the English jury, pointing out that from its very 
beginnings, premodern Christendom was “an age haunted, as our world no longer is, by 
the fear of damnation.”13 One of the ways one’s soul could be damned was by convicting 
a person of a crime.14 Early Christians took their Matthew seriously: “Judge not, lest ye 
be judged!”15 If you passed verdict on another who was then sentenced to a “blood 
punishment”16—that is, death or disfigurement—then your soul was in genuine peril.17 
Avoiding this risk of damnation—not determining the factual guilt or innocence of the 
accused—was the primary goal of premodern criminal procedure.18 In other words, the 
procedures that evolved into juries and reasonable doubt were created to provide “moral 
comfort,” not “factual proof.”19 
This goal was achieved through various “responsibility shifting procedures,” 
mechanisms by which the judge could deny moral responsibility for the punishment 
imposed.20 The most striking early examples of responsibility shifting procedures were 
the infamous judicial ordeal and trial by battle, which were commonly used in all European 
societies by A.D. 1000—that is, the period immediately preceding the birth of the English 
                                                          
 7. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 16 (6th ed. 2008) (“Thus, the normal rule that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt implies a social or political or moral judgment that we are far more willing to tolerate erroneous 
acquittals than erroneous convictions.”). 
 8. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 5. 
 9. Id. at 4. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
 15. Matthew 7:1 (King James). 
 16. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. Id. at 17. 
 19. Id. at 18. 
 20. Id. at 16. 
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jury.21 During this time, there was little need for a fact-finding mechanism. Medieval 
peasant villages were very small22 and so “there were plenty of cases in which there was 
no dispute about the facts whatsoever.”23 But thanks to the teachings of leading Christian 
theologists such as Saint Ambrose, Saint Augustine, and Saint Jerome, the fear of damning 
their souls by passing judgment on another still weighed heavily on all Christians.24 As a 
result, the feudal lords “simply could not induce humans to speak honestly about what they 
had seen or heard.”25 They therefore turned to God to pass judgment, in the form of the 
judicial ordeal.26 Whitman describes the ordeal as follows: 
The most common forms used in Europe were the ordeal of the hot iron, by which 
an accused person was compelled to grasp a red-hot iron in his bare hand; and the 
ordeal of the cold water, by which the accused, naked and bound, was lowered into 
a pit of water. . . . These frightening proceedings were understood to be “judgments 
of God,” efforts to induce God to decide the case by giving his “divine 
testimony.”27 
Because these judgments were passed by God and not by the judge who oversaw the 
proceedings, the judge’s soul was shielded from spiritual harm. However, the use of 
ordeals and trial by battle declined steadily over the period from 1000–1250.28 The Church 
preached against their use, as they tempted God to perform a miracle, and in 1215 
emphatically banned clerics (who were also often judges) from being involved in these so-
called “Judgments of Blood.”29 Once the ban on clerical involvement sounded the death 
knell for the judicial ordeal and trial by battle, European rulers had to search for other 
forms of responsibility shifting mechanisms in order to shield their souls.30 This search 
took very different paths on continental Europe and in England, culminating in the creation 
of “two sophisticated legal systems . . . that are in use in every part of the developed world 
today.”31 These are, of course, “the common law of England, and the civil law of the 
Continent.”32 
On the Continent, judges found their answer in the teachings of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas (among others)33 who argued that if a judge sentences someone based solely on 
the evidence presented, and scrupulously follows the appropriate procedures, “it is not the 
judge” who passes judgment; rather, it is the law itself, along with “those who declared 
him to be guilty.”34 The Continental judge therefore took refuge behind “rigorous 
                                                          
 21. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 53. 
 22. Id. at 73–74. 
 23. Id. at 56. 
 24. See id. at 35–49. 
 25. Id. at 57. 
 26. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 60. 
 27. Id. at 53. 
 28. Id. at 58. 
 29. Id. at 48 (“That pronouncement was the canon known as ‘Judgments of Blood,’ the eighteenth canon of 
the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This was the canon that preached the abolition of the judicial ordeal.”). 
 30. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 90. 
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 92–95. 
 34. Id. at 92. 
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procedure”35 and steadfastly refused to rely on any “private knowledge”—that is, facts the 
judge was aware of but that were not part of the evidence.36 In other words, “[s]o long as 
you do not use your private knowledge, it is the law that kills him, and not you.”37 Hence 
the infamously rigid, bureaucratic inquisitorial system was born. 
In England, judges found a very different mechanism for avoiding passing judgment 
and thereby shielding their souls from damnation: they passed the buck to the jury. 
Whitman explains that the “early English efforts to compel testimony and accusation 
culminated in the creation of jury trial: early English jurors were indeed nothing other than 
accusing witnesses, who were legally compelled to give their testimony under oath.”38 But 
jurors were more than accusing witnesses; they were also required to pass judgment: 
With the abolition of the ordeal, jurors were obliged, at least in principle, not only 
to serve as witnesses but also to render the general verdict of “guilty.” This meant 
that thirteenth-century jurors effectively mixed the roles of witness and judge, 
which put them in a position that had been vigorously condemned by Christian 
moral theology.39 
In other words, “English law spared the judge moral responsibility.”40 But in doing 
so, “English law put all of the moral burden on the witness and the accuser—which is to 
say, in effect, that it put all the moral burden on the jury.”41 This left the poor English juror 
in a perilous spiritual predicament. And according to Whitman, “[h]istorians have not 
grasped the gravity of the moral challenge faced by jurors, and as a consequence they have 
not grasped the original sense of the reasonable doubt rule.”42 Jurors continued to be in 
moral peril over the centuries of English common law development, because contrary to 
the views of most historians,43 “jurors were still expected to make use of their private 
knowledge of the case, at least occasionally.”44 This meant that they continued to mix the 
roles of witness and judge, and thereby remained in moral peril.45 As a consequence, many 
authors of this period “saw the moral drama of jury trial as a struggle over the ‘burthen’ 
of the responsibility for judgment—a struggle in which the judges had the upper hand.”46 
One of the principle points of contention was around the jury’s ability to render 
special verdicts. As Whitman explains, “[t]he common law distinguishes between the 
‘general’ verdict—verdicts of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’—and ‘special’ verdicts, by which the 
jury simply makes certain findings without making an ultimate determination of guilt or 
innocence.”47 The ability of jurors to render special verdicts protected the souls of jurors, 
since they were not pronouncing on guilt. According to Whitman, “during the Middle Ages 
                                                          
 35. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 94. 
 36. Id. at 107–09. 
 37. Id. at 112. 
 38. Id. at 128. 
 39. Id. 
 40. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 129. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 150. 
 43. Id. at 152. 
 44. Id. at 151. 
 45. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 151. 
 46. Id. at 149. 
 47. Id. at 155. 
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criminal jurors were not yet rigorously compelled to enter general verdicts in the morally 
fraught business of inflicting blood punishments.”48 But over time, the insistence that 
criminal jurors enter general verdicts increased. “By the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, this resulted in a kind of moral crisis of jury trial—a moral crisis that produced 
the reasonable doubt standard.”49 
In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, “the English Crown worked hard to 
diminish the right of jurors to resist giving judgments.”50 The Protestant jurors of this 
period continued to resist passing judgment, according to Whitman, for the same reasons 
as their medieval Catholic forebears. Whitman supports this claim by referring to “the 
literature of ‘cases of conscience’” that was widely read and well understood at the time. 
As Whitman explains, “[t]he cases of conscience literature is the Protestant, and especially 
Calvinist, repository of the law of conscience whose history since the twelfth century [we] 
have traced.”51 Despite the emergence of science and philosophy, “[t]he prevailing 
conception of the trial, and of the jury’s role, still revolved around the moral responsibility 
for judgment. When it came to justice, the old untransformed theology of blood was still 
the order of the day.”52 
Whitman insists that it is “only by reading the sections on judging, in the cases of 
conscience literature that we can understand the seminal developments of the late 
seventeenth century and after.”53 Among the most prominent of these developments were 
“the great jury cases of the later seventeenth century, Wagstaff’s Case and Bushel’s 
Case.”54 Both cases arose out of the prosecution of Quakers under the Conventicles Act 
of 1664, by which “the Crown attempted to forbid gatherings that might foster political or 
religious sedition.”55 As pamphleteers of the time insisted, echoing the cases of 
conscience, “jurors who convicted accused persons under the Conventicles Act did so at 
the cost of their own salvation.”56 Consequently, “jurors sought to deliver ‘not guilty’ 
verdicts”—despite no dispute about the underlying facts—and were consequently fined by 
the Crown.57 Wagstaff’s Case and Bushel’s Case both addressed the Crown’s attempts to 
“discipline recalcitrant jurors.” In Wagstaff’s Case in 1665, “the decision made it clear 
that King’s Bench could make use of its well-established authority to fine jurors who 
refused to enter guilty verdicts as directed.”58 
Five years later, however, in the famous prosecution of William Penn, the jurors 
resisted the severe pressures of the Crown and again rendered a verdict of “not guilty.”59 
One of the jurors, Edward Bushel, was imprisoned and brought a writ of habeas corpus.60 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 153. 
 49. Id. 
 50. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 161. 
 51. Id. at 163. 
 52. Id. at 166. 
 53. Id. at 167. 
 54. Id. at 161. 
 55. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 173. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 176. 
 60. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 176. 
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The Chief Justice of King’s Bench granted the writ and freed Bushel “in a celebrated 
decision that definitively established that ‘a juror cannot be fined for a verdict given 
according to his conscience.’”61 Among other things, this established the power that we 
now refer to as jury nullification. But for Whitman’s purposes, what mattered most was 
the rationale for the Chief Justice’s decision: “it was founded on the ground, very strange 
to modern readers, that jurors might use private knowledge.”62 To put it another way, 
“[b]ecause the jury mixed its fact-finding—partly on the basis of private knowledge—in 
its general verdicts, it could not be fined or imprisoned.”63 To do so would be to 
unconscionably coerce a juror into “putting his own salvation at risk.”64 
The prohibition on forcing jurors to give general verdicts created a serious problem 
for the Crown, which of course wanted to enforce its laws and have guilty people 
convicted. This consequently caused a dilemma to the Englishman who took his public 
duty seriously, since “good Christians must serve.”65 According to Whitman, “it was the 
resulting tensions that produced the reasonable doubt formula at the end of the eighteenth 
century: ‘Reasonable doubt’ emerged as a formula intended to ease the fears of those jurors 
who might otherwise refuse to pronounce the defendant guilty.”66 
Moreover, the terms of this formula were found in the same theology that led jurors 
to resist passing judgment in the first place. For the premodern Christian theology of blood 
judgments had always had a strand dealing with different degrees of doubt. In the hands 
of the English Protestants, the degrees of doubt—and the difference between genuine 
“doubts” and mere “scruples”—turned on the application of reason: 
[T]he eighteenth century moralists continued to insist on the old provisos. 
Christians were to stay upon the safer path, which meant that they were to listen to 
their doubts. But this was not to be taken too far. . . . [A] doubting conscience was 
not to be confused with a scrupulous conscience. Doubts were legitimate and had 
to be obeyed; scruples were foolish and had to be ignored. In particular, the 
moralists held, the good Protestant was always to use his “reason,” wherever 
possible, in order to remove his doubts.67 
In other words, “doubts were . . . subject to a test of reason.”68 One did not commit 
a mortal sin if he conscientiously considered the evidence and made a decision based on 
reason. “In the end, a reasoned decision would leave the soul of the Christian judge [or 
juror] safe.”69 
And so we arrive at last to the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” justified not 
because it protects the accused from being convicted, but because it protects the soul of 
the Christian juror from damnation. As Whitman says, “the eighteenth century theology 
                                                          
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 177. 
 64. Id. at 179. 
 65. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 190. Whitman explains, “So it was that the fundamental dilemma of the late 
seventeenth century hung on, opposing the safe conscience to the claims of public duty.” Id. 
 66. Id. at 186. 
 67. Id. at 190. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 191. 
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of reasonable doubt was not designed with the problems of factual uncertainty in mind at 
all. It was designed to comfort, coax, and prod anxious and reluctant Christians.”70 The 
modern American justice system retains this concept of reasonable doubt, but for a very 
different function: 
[T]he formulation that emerged in the eighteenth century—“beyond a reasonable 
doubt”—is still alive in American law today. Indeed, the proposition that guilt must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt has become a pillar of our secular legal 
system. But we no longer understand it as a principle intended to soothe the 
anxieties of Christians who fear the responsibility of judgment. Instead, we treat 
beyond a reasonable doubt as a fact-finding principle, as a heuristic formula that 
can help guide the individual juror in the effort to achieve sufficient certainty about 
uncertain facts.71 
This disconnect between the origin and design of the reasonable doubt standard, on 
the one hand, and its modern function, on the other, provides answers to contemporary 
questions about the criminal jury. For example, it helps explain why it is so difficult for 
judges to define and jurors to understand. The answer to the question of just how much 
factual doubt is reasonable remains elusive precisely because the reasonable doubt 
standard was not originally about factual doubt at all. The original purpose of the jury trial 
also explains other aspects of criminal trials, such as the requirement of jury unanimity. 
The unanimity rule did not arise as a fact-finding rule or fact-certainty rule, but as a moral 
comfort rule: “it allow[ed] the twelve to share the heavy moral responsibility for judgment, 
and therefore to diffuse it among themselves.”72 
II. THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 
Like Whitman, Hale traces the development of the jury over a substantial period, 
from about the time of the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century to the present day. 
And like Whitman, Hale also emphasizes that the jury’s role was not limited to fact-
finding. As Hale points out, the jury is a political as well as a judicial institution. 
Hale describes several aspects of the jury as a political institution. The jury allowed 
the “common people” to participate in the processes of government; it was the “lower 
house of the judiciary,” the “people’s voice in the courts.”73 This was “the best means 
within our knowledge of keeping the administration of justice in tune with the 
community,”74 as well as aiding in maintaining community acceptance of the law. 
Even though getting the correct verdict was the most important goal of the courts, 
“of almost equal importance” was ensuring that justice was done in a way that was 
fair and that satisfied the defeated parties and the community as a whole, especially 
                                                          
 70. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 206. 
 71. Id. at 202. 
 72. Id. at 204. 
 73. HALE, supra note 1, at 76, 376, 383. 
 74. Id. at 189. Hale notes several historical examples of juries refusing to apply the law, and thereby affecting 
legal change. These include forcing the English Parliament to change the laws of homicide, and effectively 
ending the death penalty for adultery in Massachusetts, and later for all crimes in Michigan and Wisconsin. Id. 
at 16–17, 56, 115. 
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in cases that divided the community’s sentiments.75 
The jury therefore empowered citizens; “ordinary citizens could stand against judges, 
prosecutors, and even the monarch himself.”76 From its earliest development, the jury trial 
was understood as “a check on royal power” and other forms of tyranny.77 In its American 
incarnation, according to Hale, the jury trial also served as a source of political education, 
providing those who served with a model of deliberative decision-making.78 Hale cites 
studies showing citizens who serve on juries “become more generally engaged in public 
affairs.”79 In each of these ways, jury trials “make citizens powerful.”80 
Hale recounts the important role the institution of the jury has played in American 
history, such as the part it played in the lead-up to the American Revolution81 and the 
debates about the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.82 Hale also describes the many 
important changes the jury trial has undergone throughout its history on either side of the 
Atlantic, but his true passion is for one particular change: what he refers to as the shift 
from the “modern jury” to the “postmodern jury.” 
According to Hale the jury in America reached its acme, its triumph, prior to the jury 
reforms of the mid-twentieth century, before the “invention” of the representative jury.83 
The modern conception of the jury was still “that jury service called for qualities of 
character and judgment that exceeded those required for voting.”84 Those who served on 
the jury should be “above average.”85 In the first half of the twentieth century, states used 
several methods for ensuring that jurors were drawn from “the better class of citizens in 
respect of intelligence, moral character, and business experience.”86 Hale describes two of 
these in detail. The first was the “Cleveland system” in which people selected from lists 
of registered voters “were then required to appear before the jury commissioners for 
examination.”87 Only those who exhibited sufficient honesty, morality, intelligence, and 
“experience in life” qualified for jury service.88 
The second method—and the one of which Hale is evidently most fond—was the 
“key-man system of jury selection.”89 Under the key-man system, “jury commissioners 
solicited the names of likely jurors from key men (and sometimes women, after passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment) in the community: civic leaders, clergymen, businessmen, 
schoolteachers, newspaper editors, officers of social service clubs, trade union officials, 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 162. 
 76. Id. at 60. 
 77. Id. at 19. 
 78. HALE, supra note 1, at 60, 92, 190. 
 79. Id. at 406. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 46. 
 82. Id. at 68–88. 
 83. HALE, supra note 1, at 193–206. 
 84. Id. at 141. 
 85. Id. at 146. 
 86. Id. at 159. 
 87. Id. at 189, 192. 
 88. HALE, supra note 1, at 191. 
 89. Id. at 192. 
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and so on.”90 This system “had an important practical advantage for jury commissioners 
pressed to locate capable jurors: those making the recommendations presumably knew 
something about the persons they suggested, giving their recommendations added 
credibility.”91 
Of course, the drawback of this system is self-evident. Only those who were known 
and liked by these key men had a chance of serving on a jury—and only those known and 
liked by the jury commissioners and court clerks were considered “key men.” The 
problems this created were, unsurprisingly, most evident in southern states. In Rabinowitz 
v. United States,92 for example, “[t]he court record shows that while blacks were roughly 
thirty-five percent of the population of the Macon Division [in Georgia], Negroes 
constituted less than six percent of the names in the jury wheel.”93 The clerk of the district 
court explained: 
[H]e did not choose the names of many black Georgians because he “naturally did 
not know many Negroes,” having most of his dealings with “the white race.” When 
asked whether he had sought the names of Negro doctors, teachers, ministers, and 
other professionals in the counties under his jurisdiction, he replied that, 
“unfortunate as it may be, . . . I don’t know too many Negroes.” He did recall 
writing to one Negro funeral home director.94 
The key-man system was attacked on several sides in the middle of last century. The 
Supreme Court took aim at the key-man system with its “sudden reinvention of the 
‘traditional’ American jury system” as requiring a representative cross section of the 
community.95 The key-man system was abolished by the federal Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968, by which time “it had already been abandoned in about half the 
federal districts, replaced by random selection from various lists without any screening for 
subjective qualities of intelligence, morality, or common sense.”96 In Hale’s words, “the 
most important failing of the key-man system—and of discretionary jury selection more 
generally—was its alleged complicity in the exclusion of black Americans from jury 
service.”97 For example, Attorney General Ramsey Clark, testifying on behalf of the jury 
selection bill, stated that “unless we establish an objective standard . . . we risk 
discrimination through subjective judgment.”98 
For Hale, the abolition of the key-man system is a cause for great lament. Hale 
mounts a spirited, if misguided, defense of the key-man system, arguing at length that the 
key-man system—and discretion more generally—were not in fact complicit in racial 
discrimination in jury selection. His key claims are worth reading in full. He asserts, for 
example: 
Since racial discrimination could hardly be described as a result of “subjective 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 192. 
 91. Id. at 220–21. 
 92. 366 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 93. HALE, supra note 1, at 225. 
 94. Id. at 226. 
 95. Id. at 231, 237. 
 96. Id. at 224. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. HALE, supra note 1, at 236. 
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judgment” or “unconscious bias”—to the racist, race is an objective fact and bias is 
a deliberate choice—then the bill . . . must have had a broader target in mind. It is 
hard not to draw the conclusion that the target was discretion itself, even when such 
discretion had no connection to the exclusion of any group from jury service.99 
In Hale’s view, “there is nothing to suggest that a racially neutral key-man system 
would have been hard to devise.”100 Moreover, it was not the key-man system, or 
discretionary jury selection processes, that was responsible for racial discrimination in jury 
selection. According to Hale, “what stood in the way of a racially impartial jury system in 
Georgia in 1966 . . . was not the key-man system but the persistence of the regime of white 
supremacy.”101 Hale elaborates: 
[I]t is important to pause briefly and recall the failings for which the key-man 
system cannot be held responsible. The exclusion of blacks from juries was the 
product of deeply embedded social and political customs that would have worked 
the same damage and had the same result, whatever the law required.102 
Hale’s arguments about the connection—or lack thereof—between subjective, 
discretionary jury selection and racial discrimination are deeply flawed. To insist that 
racial discrimination cannot be described as the result of “subjective judgment” or 
“unconscious bias” is to misunderstand—or redefine—each of them. Hale seems to be 
arguing that the only kind of racial discrimination, by definition, is overt, deliberate, and 
openly admitted. According to Hale’s position, unconscious racial bias either does not 
exist or, if it does, is not something we should be concerned about. This is an untenable 
position. There is voluminous scholarly and empirical evidence—not to mention the lived 
experience of the millions of people subjected to it—that implicit bias is both real and 
harmful.103 Similarly, it is incontrovertible that subjective discretion allows a pretext for 
deliberate racism—which Hale himself acknowledges when he refers, in the context of 
voting, to “the power of white officials to adapt any procedure to an unlawful purpose.”104 
That racial minorities are disproportionately harmed by the criminal justice system 
cannot be denied. African Americans, for example, are not responsible for more crime than 
whites, but they are disproportionately arrested, convicted, and sentenced to longer prison 
terms.105 Yet Hale is, at the very least, tone deaf to these realities. He laments that “[i]n 
                                                          
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 228. See also id. at 227, n.36 (“The [Rabinowitz] ruling simply assumed that the key-man system 
could not be administered in a racially neutral way.”). 
 101. Id. at 228–29. 
 102. Id. at 232–33. 
 103. For a sampling of the recent legal literature addressing implicit bias, see Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. 
Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F. 406 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/systemic-
implicit-bias; Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2017); Cynthia Lee, A New 
Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843 (2015); Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: 
Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling 
the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed 
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010). 
 104. HALE, supra note 1, at 233. 
 105. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911 
(1997). For a very recent comprehensive study showing the racial bias in sentencing, see Josh Salman, Emily Le 
Coz & Elizabeth Johnson, Florida’s Broken Sentencing System: Designed for Fairness, It Fails to Account for 
Prejudice, HERALD TRIB., http://projects.heraldtribune.com/bias/sentencing/#clarification. 
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many cities, prosecutors find it more difficult to secure convictions of minority defendants 
in districts with large numbers of black or Hispanic jurors.”106 Such miscarriages of justice 
were less likely when “the jury list was compiled through use of the key-man system 
[because] nearly all the veniremen were solid, more than usually solid, citizens.”107 In the 
context of peremptory challenges, Hale asserts: 
[A]lways, below the surface, is the rarely spoken reality: precisely because race is 
an issue in American life, it can be risky for a prosecutor to try a black defendant 
before black jurors. Wouldn’t it be wiser, then, to replace black jurors with those 
less likely to harbor suspicions about white prosecutors or white police officers?108 
Hale concedes that “[n]o doubt, attorneys always wanted sympathetic jurors” but 
insists that “in the past, however, they had a limited opportunity to find them.”109 
According to Hale, in other words, propertied white men—and people handpicked by 
government officials—did not have sympathies for any particular people, values, or 
viewpoints. They just had objective facts.110 
Hale describes the replacement of discretionary jury selection with a jury drawn 
randomly from a representative cross section of the community as a move from a modern 
jury to a postmodern jury. For Hale, the term “postmodern” is by no means a compliment; 
indeed, Hale appears to consider this the beginning of the American jury’s titular decline. 
According to Hale, “the most intriguing aspect” of the push for a representative jury 
system “was the appearance—dare we say debut?—of a distinctly postmodern 
understanding of truth (or ‘truth’).”111 To claim that discretionary, subjective jury 
selection would inevitably result in bias is, according to Hale, the equivalent of claiming 
that “truth” is a mere social construct. According to Hale, to insist that juries be drawn 
from a representative cross section necessarily involves denying that there is any such 
thing as objective truth. It entails that “justice is a function of class,” and that “there is one 
truth for the poor and another for the rich.”112 The shift to the postmodern jury involves—
in Hale’s view—a fundamental change in the concept of truth: “This is not just an 
alternative understanding of jury deliberation; it is the necessary consequence of the belief 
that there is no such thing as truth.”113 And if there is no such thing as objective truth—or 
no such thing as truth at all—then the jury obviously cannot perform its traditional function 
                                                          
 106. HALE, supra note 1, at 310. 
 107. Id. at 316. 
 108. Id. at 276 (emphasis added). This complaint is especially astonishing in an age where, for example, white 
police officers kill unarmed black men (with tragic regularity) but are almost never convicted. See, e.g., Mitch 
Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html?mcubz=3. 
 109. HALE, supra note 1, at 326. 
 110. Hale emphasizes his belief that propertied white males have superior judgment to people from other 
sectors of society when he criticizes the following state of affairs: “[T]he model impartial juror is no longer the 
middle-to-upper class male property owner known among similar citizens as a man of good moral character and 
moderate temperament. Instead, society recognizes the judgment of such people as one perspective among many, 
no more or less neutral than any other.” Id. at 280 (quoting Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of 
Representative Juries, VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 445 (1993)).   
 111. HALE, supra note 1, at 242. 
 112. Id. (quoting Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Jury Reform Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A. J. 132, 134 (1967)). 
 113. Id. at 408. 
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of “determining objective ‘truth’ as far as is humanly possible.”114 
Hale is indeed correct that justice is a function of class, that there is one set of rules 
for the rich and another for the poor—but not in the way that he means. Quite the contrary, 
in fact. The poor, and racial minorities, face a harsher reality than the white and wealthy 
when it comes to the criminal justice system and trial by jury. But in terms of the 
metaphysical and epistemic conceptions of truth, Hale is incorrect to conclude that 
insisting on a representative jury is to give up on the idea of objective truth. The fact-
finding task of a jury is to draw inferences from evidence to facts (i.e., truth). We can 
surely understand that two people, from very different social backgrounds, could interpret 
the same evidence differently, without saying that there is no such thing as objective truth. 
To use Hale’s own example, a white police officer’s testimony may be less credible to a 
black juror who has been subjected to stop-and-frisk style policing than to a white 
suburbanite whose interaction with police has always been positive.115 That does not mean 
there are two truths; rather there is one truth about which one of the hypothetical jurors is 
mistaken in any given instance. The benefit of a jury drawn from a representative cross 
section, even purely on fact-finding terms, is that the potential mistakes (too much 
skepticism or too much credulity) are not always in the one direction. 
Perhaps more importantly, in his criticisms of the representative jury, Hale seems to 
temporarily forget that the jury is also a political institution. The jury can optimally serve 
its political functions—as the “lower house of the judiciary” that ensures the law conforms 
with community values, and in turn ensures the law is accepted by the entire community—
only if the jury is truly representative of the community. Similarly, a representative jury 
ensures the benefits of jury service—political education, involvement, and consequently 
power—are not granted merely to a select few. 
CONCLUSION 
Hale’s The Jury in America is an informative story of the evolution of the jury in the 
Anglo-American legal system. Unfortunately, the author does not adequately grasp the 
relationships between discrimination and implicit bias, subjectivity and discretion, 
evidence and truth. This shortcoming limits the extent to which The Jury in America can 
aid us in meeting the challenges of the contemporary jury system. Perhaps ironically, it is 
Whitman’s more esoteric history of “reasonable doubt” that provides us with advice worth 
heeding, especially in this era of DNA exonerations of those wrongly convicted by a 
jury:116 “Instructing jurors forcefully that their decision is ‘a moral one,’ about the fate of 
a fellow human being, is, in the last analysis, the only meaningful modern way to be 
faithful to the original spirit of reasonable doubt.”117 
 
                                                          
  114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html; 
Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 116. See, e.g., Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate 
(stating that, since 1992, the Innocence Project has obtained 353 DNA exonerations and identified 152 alternative 
perpetrators). 
 117. WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 212. 
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